Sellars's Interpretive Variations on Kant's Transcendental Idealist Themes by O'Shea, James
‘Sellars’s Interpretive Variations on Kant’s Transcendental Idealist Themes’ 
 
James R. O’Shea, University College Dublin 
 
 
(This is the author’s post-peer reviewed version accepted for publication.  For 
citations, please refer to the published version in Luca Corti and Antonio 
Nunziante, eds. (2018), Sellars and The History of Modern Philosophy (London and New 
York: Routledge), pp. 79–96. ISBN-13: 978-1-138-06568-0.  
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159546 ) 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  Sellars’ career-long engagement with Kant’s philosophy involved both 
readings of Kant and appropriations of Kant that are nuanced, original, and related in 
complex ways to Sellars’ own philosophical views. In some ways similar to Strawson’s classic 
reading, Sellars defended Kant’s theory of experience and his analysis of human knowledge 
as essentially correct. This includes various views on the nature of conceptual cognition, the 
thinking self, practical reason, perceptual experience, and the lawfulness of nature. On the 
other hand, and again like Strawson, Sellars regarded Kant’s transcendental idealism as 
involving a strong ontological commitment to unknowable but thinkable (and non-
spatiotemporal) ‘things in themselves’.  However, whereas Strawson regarded such a position 
as deeply incoherent, Sellars argues that Kant’s theological conception of things in themselves 
can coherently be replaced with a scientific realist conception of things in themselves as 
theoretically postulated imperceptible processes, which play a structurally similar role for 
Sellars in grounding the Kantian-phenomenal ‘appearances’ in the ‘manifest image’ of the 
world. Sellars’ highly complex but sophisticated reading of Kant on sensibility and intuition, 
when combined with Sellars’ own idiosyncratic views on sensory qualia, render it even more 
difficult to come to terms with Sellars’ engagements with Kant’s idealism. This chapter 
attempts to provide a concise presentation and evaluation of certain central themes in Sellars’ 
complex philosophical dialogue with Kant. 
 
 
 Wilfrid Sellars’ 1966 John Locke Lectures, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes 
(1968, ‘SM’) were delivered the same year as the publication of P. F. Strawson’s groundbreaking book, 
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1966). Both books are philosophically 
sophisticated and ambitious, both in the interpretation of Kant and in relation to expressing the 
authors’ own philosophical views. As we shall see, however, Sellars’ book presents some exceptional 
interpretive challenges for the reader, and I hope to provide some clarifying guidance to the terrain.  
In this chapter I will examine some of the main contours of Sellars’ interpretation of Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy, focusing on this occasion on its most controversial aspect: his complex engagements with 
Kant’s transcendental idealist distinction between objects as ‘appearances’ and as ‘things in themselves’. 
Whereas elsewhere I have primarily been concerned to isolate those aspects of Sellars’ analytic Kantian 
or (as I call it) ‘Kantian naturalist’ theory of experience that I find most defensible, in what follows I 
want to explore Sellars’ more full-blooded treatments of Kant’s transcendental idealism in particular, 
both for its own sake and as an interpretation of Kant.  
 
 In The Bounds of Sense Strawson distinguished centrally between ‘two faces of the Critique’ (1966, 
cf. Part One). One face for Strawson is represented by Kant’s deeply insightful ‘Metaphysics of 
Experience,’ which turned out, not surprisingly, to bear strong affinities to the ‘descriptive 
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metaphysics’ of our experience defended in Strawson’s own classic work, Individuals (1959) (cf. 1996, 
part two). The other face, as Strawson sees it, is the ‘incoherent’ and ‘disastrous model’ of Kant’s 
‘transcendental psychology’ or ‘transcendental subjectivism’: the ‘theory of the mind making Nature’ 
as a realm of mere ‘appearances’ in what Strawson derides as Kant’s ‘Metaphysics of Transcendental 
Idealism’ (1966, 16–23, and part four). The former, defensible a priori or ‘transcendental’ theory of 
experience ‘is concerned with the conceptual structure which is presupposed in all empirical inquiries’ 
(1966, 18), involving for both Kant and Strawson – and for Sellars, too – the conception of one unified 
consciousness of one directly perceivable and objective spatiotemporal world of lawfully interacting 
and persisting material substances. Sellars outlined his own interpretations and updated defenses of 
Kant’s theory of experience not only in Science and Metaphysics, which tended to focus more heavily on 
Kant’s transcendental idealism, but in particular in such articles as ‘Some Remarks on Kant’s Theory 
of Experience’ (1967, KTE), ‘…this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks...’ (1970, ‘I’), ‘Kant’s 
Transcendental Idealism’ (1976, KTI), and ‘The Role of Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience’ 
(1978, IKTE), all of which were collected posthumously in Kant’s Transcendental Metaphysics (KTM) in 
2002.1  I and many of the other authors referred to in this chapter (for example, Brandom, Landy, 
McDowell, Rosenberg, Sicha, and Westphal) have laid out and defended key aspects of Sellars’ views 
on Kant’s analysis or theory of experience, in relation to the thinking self, conceptual content, causal 
laws, perceptual knowledge, the refutation of (empirical) idealism, normativity, and so on. My present 
purpose, however, is to take a more careful look at Sellars’ interpretation of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism as found primarily in that deep but enigmatic book, Science and Metaphysics.  
 
 
1. Sellars’ Manifest Image ‘Appearances’ and Scientific Image ‘Things in Themselves’ 
 
 
 Whereas Strawson rejected as entirely incoherent Kant’s distinction between objects (and 
persons) as appearances to us in nature as opposed to as non-spatiotemporal things in themselves, 
Sellars takes Kant’s transcendental idealism to be a near-miss that can be successfully reformulated in 
terms of Sellars’ own famous distinction between the manifest (MI) and scientific (SI) images of the 
human-being-in-the-world: 
 
As I see it, in any case, a consistent scientific realist must hold that the world of everyday 
experience is a phenomenal world in the Kantian sense, existing only as the contents of actual 
and obtainable conceptual representings, the obtainability of which is explained not, as for 
Kant, by things in themselves known only to God, but by scientific objects about which, 
barring catastrophe, we shall know more and more as the years go by. (SM VI, §61) 
 
Having explored Sellars’ scientific realism and his distinction between the ‘two images’ elsewhere 
(2007, 2016), I will present the key points succinctly here without full textual justification. The “world 
 
1 Thanks to the work of Jeffrey Sicha, KTM and Sellars’ other publications continue to be available at very affordable 
prices at www.ridgeviewpublishing.com, and Sicha has also been at work (together with Pedro Amaral among others) 
making Sellars’ publications available in electronic editions. Also important for understanding Sellars’ views on Kant 
are his 1975–76 lectures to students at the University of Pittsburgh, Sellars’ KPT. For book-length interpretations of 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason strongly influenced by Sellars, see especially Rosenberg 2005; and influenced by both 
Sellars and Rosenberg on Kant are Powell 1990, O’Shea 2012, and Landy 2015 (all students of Rosenberg). See also 
Sicha’s substantial introduction to Sellars’ KTM. Also deeply influenced by Sellars and Kant, and central to current 
debates (including on Sellars’ reading of Kant) are Brandom 2015 and McDowell 2009. For more on Sellars as a 
pivotal figure in the history of Kant-influenced analytic philosophy, see Westphal 2010. 
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of everyday experience” or manifest image (MI) for Sellars is defined in terms of (1) the nature of 
persons as concept-using thinkers and intentional agents,2 and (2) the nature of the ‘strictly’ perceptible3 
physical objects that are basic in our common sense conceptual framework (Sellars PSIM, passim). 
 
 Regarding (2), let us follow Sellars and use visually perceived expanses of color – for example, 
the redness of an apple’s surface – as our main example of the sorts of ordinary sensible qualities that 
characterize the everyday objects of our experience. I will not present or evaluate his arguments on 
this particular matter, but it is well known that Sellars argued throughout his works (e.g., PSIM) that, 
phenomenologically considered, MI physical objects possess ‘homogeneous’ color-contents as their 
constituent content-characters in a way that he contends is ostensibly incompatible with the 
‘postulational’ scientific image (SI) conception of physical objects as exhaustively composed of 
colorless particles or fields as conceived by ongoing modern scientific theoretical explanations. 
Through a long journey of highly sophisticated categorial-ontological and phenomenological analyses 
(cf. Rosenberg 2007, Ch. 9, and deVries 2005, Ch. 8), Sellars argued that the expanses of colour that 
populate the MI-world of common sense physical objects must eventually be reconceived (ontologically 
‘relocated’, as it were) as the contents solely of the sensory states of the perceivers’ central nervous 
systems when they are sensing-redly. That is, such a perceiver is having a sensation of red in the manner 
that is typically caused either by the visible presence of (what in MI is responded to as) a ‘red’ physical 
object, or, in the case of hallucinations, non-standard lighting, etc., by some other stimulation of the 
visual cortex that is responsible for the experience.  
 
2 There is an important sense in which for Sellars, as for Kant, persons as thinking selves and intending agents are in 
crucial, normative-functional respects not ‘objects’ in such a way as to render them candidates for ontological 
elimination and replacement by more adequate scientific successor conceptions of their nature. This is compatible 
with there also being many other aspects of ourselves as embodied persons that are subject to such explanatory 
reconceptions in the ongoing development of the scientific image. The distinction between persons and objects is in 
fact the key to Sellars’ synoptic fusion or integration of the MI and SI ontologies: crudely, the MI-objects get replaced 
by SI-processes, Kantian-thinking agents remain through the integration, albeit with enormously significant 
reconceptions of their nature. In particular our understanding of qualitative sensory consciousness (e.g., color 
consciousness) will have been radically transformed, but along many other dimensions as well (cf. Christias 2016, all 
of whose recent writings on Sellars I highly recommend). See O’Shea 2007 passim and 2016, chapter 7 for the textual 
support for these and other characterizations of Sellars’ overall views appealed to in this chapter.  
 
3 It is seldom appreciated that Sellars’ distinction between MI and SI rests definitively, as far as the ‘objects’ of those 
images or conceptual constructs are concerned, on a twofold understanding of the nature of ‘perception’ (e.g., SRII V, 
§55–8; O’Shea 2007, 33–8): crudely put, (1) a ‘strict’ or ‘manifest’ sense in which what we directly perceive are the 
Aristotelian ‘proper and common sensible qualities’ (e.g., color and shape) possessed by ordinary physical objects in 
the constitutive way discussed briefly in the main text here (call these ‘manifest perceptible’ physical objects); as 
opposed to (2) an all-inclusive ‘pragmatic’ conception of perceptual observation or detection developed by Feyerabend 
and Sellars, and inherited by Rorty and Brandom, as any reliable, non-inferential response to objects (any ‘language-
entry transition’, in Sellars’ terms).  
 Call the latter, i.e. (2), any ‘reliably observed’ objects or processes. This pragmatic conception covers all 
non-inferential perception for Sellars, whether it be the ‘strict’ perception of MI-objects, or the observational detection 
of SI-processes (for example, ‘there goes an electron’ uttered  by a trained physicist as a reliable non-inferential 
response to a streak in a cloud chamber). The objects of MI are defined or stipulated by Sellars to be those that are 
strictly manifest perceptible, whereas the SI is defined in terms of those evolving theories of modern science that 
incorporate the ‘postulation’ of new basic objects, processes, fields, etc., that are manifestly imperceptible. The latter 
(manifestly) ‘unobservable’ processes not only may, but Sellars argues must become directly ‘reliably observable’ in 
sense (2), e.g., in the manner of the electrons example given above (but successfully ‘gone global’, as it were), if 
scientific realism is to be fully vindicated (cf. SM V, §90–1; SRII V, §§55–8, VII §§72–4, VIII §§89–91. Sellars’ 
conception of scientific realism was in this last respect unusual by standard post-1970 Putnam-Kripke lights (for 
further discussion, cf. O’Shea 2007, Chs. 2, 6, 7). 
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 Furthermore, Sellars argued that since our MI-experiences of colored physical objects are of 
bounded regions or expanses of color – put crudely, since Berkeley was right that perceived color and 
perceived shape (extension) go seamlessly together in our experience – the sensory states of perceivers 
must somehow preserve (that is, coherently be conceived as the ‘true home’ of) both color and shape, 
as for example when we have a sensation in the ‘of-a-red-rectangle’ manner. So finally, since it is not 
coherent to suppose that such sensory states of perceivers are literally colored and shaped in the way 
that MI-physical objects are conceived to be, the sensory states or ‘sense impressions’ of the perceiver 
must be reconceived (and will be, in a future, more adequate SI-neurophysiological theory) to have 
corresponding intrinsic qualities and geometrical relationships that are analogous to and systematically 
represent the qualities and relations that we conceive (within MI) as their standard physical causes. 
‘Succinctly put, impressions have attributes and stand in relations which are counterparts of the 
attributes and relations of physical objects and events’ (SM I, §65). 
 
 In the end, crudely put, Sellars’ view is that our common sense MI-conception of colored 
physical objects reflects the fact that our sensory systems evolved to get us around our environment 
and to avoid poisonous berries, not to reveal to us directly the ultimately correct categorial ontology 
of the natural world. This is one main source of Sellars’ famous (or infamous) scientia mensura view, 
that is, his Feyerabendian thesis (SRII V, §48) that, strictly speaking, the ordinary perceptible objects 
of the manifest image do not really exist, i.e., as so conceived within MI – they are ‘mere appearances’ or 
objective ‘representables’ in the Kantian sense of being ‘actual’ (cf. SM II, KTE, IKTE, KTI). They 
really exist per se, i.e., as the things they are ‘in themselves’, only as radically ontologically reconceived in 
the ongoing theoretical or postulational scientific image of the human being and its world. Within the 
‘ought-to-be’ rules that implicitly govern the language of our ordinary MI-conceptual framework, it is 
of course true to assert that bananas are yellow and apples are red (i.e. true with respect to MI, as opposed 
to what is ‘really’ or ‘ultimately’ true: cf. SM V). 
 
But, speaking as a philosopher, I am quite prepared to say that the common-sense world of 
physical objects in Space and Time is unreal – that there are no such things. Or, to put it less 
paradoxically, that in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the 
measure of all things, of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. (EPM IX, §41) 
 
If we now look back to the passage from Science and Metaphysics quoted earlier, we have seen one main 
reason why Sellars believed “that a consistent scientific realist must hold that the world of everyday 
experience is a phenomenal world in the Kantian sense” (SM VI, §61). 
 
 It is important to recognize, however, that the above argument from the nature of MI-color 
and other sensible qualities is not the only sort of consideration that Sellars mobilizes in order to 
support his contention that our ordinary MI-conception of objects is merely ‘phenomenal’ in the 
Kantian sense. As Sellars argues in SM lectures V–VI as well as in PSIM and all of his other writings 
pertaining to scientific realism, there are many other dimensions in which the ongoing scientific image 
of the world, with its postulation of processes, fields, and particles that are strictly speaking not 
perceivable in principle in terms of the MI-ontology of colored physical objects, provides demonstrably 
more adequate explanations of the nature of MI-phenomena than the MI-ontology can provide of itself. This 
applies not only to the nature of perceived color and other sensible qualities, no matter how carefully 
they are phenomenologically analyzed within the ‘life-world’ of MI; it applies also to the explanation 
of how it is that we ourselves became concept-users and rational agents in the first place. Furthermore, 
Sellars argues that even our ongoing scientific conceptions of the world, too, are continually being 
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shown to be ‘mere appearances’ that are better explained by being reconceived in more adequate 
scientific theories of the world. For example, Einstein’s relativity theory reconceived the very nature 
of space, time, mass, velocity, and so on, so as to explain precisely why and how Newton’s theory and 
its accompanying object-ontology both succeeded and failed to the extent that it did, thereby revealing 
Newton’s world to be one of ‘mere appearances in the Kantian sense’ relative to its grounding in the 
real Einsteinian nature of ‘things in themselves’, which, as Sellars put it in the passage above on Kant 
(SM VI, §61), grounds the ‘obtainability’ of those regularities that are captured (and those that are not 
captured) by Newton’s laws. And so on. 
 
 With this initial background understanding of Sellars’ wider philosophical views in place, we 
can roughly put it that he offered two main reasons for regarding the MI-world of common sense 
perceptible objects to be ‘transcendentally ideal’ phenomenal appearances  in Kant’s sense: firstly, (a) 
there is the (allegedly) required ontological ‘relocation’ or explanatory reconception of perceived color-
shape-expanses and other MI-constitutive proper and common sensible qualities ‘from’ MI-objects 
‘to’ states of MI-perceivers (this is putting it very crudely), and then further SI-reconceiving such 
sensory states in a future, radically revised SI-neurophysiology that will preserve, analogically, the initial 
consciously experienced colour-shape qualitative characters and structure; and secondly, (b) Sellars 
appeals to the demonstrably more adequate explanations of the nature of reality that have already 
occurred, and will continue to occur, not only in relation to (a), but in the ongoing scientific theory-
replacements themselves. Crucially, an explanatory burden placed on SI-explanations in both cases is 
that their resulting reconceived ontologies, which reveal how things are ‘in themselves’, explain why 
things approximately lawfully appeared as they did, both in our ordinary MI perceptual world, and in the 
progress of superseded SI-ontologies such as Newton’s that are successfully corrected and 
incorporated within more adequate SI-theories such as Einstein’s.  
 
 With the rough outlines of Sellars’ own big picture in place,4 we can now take up some central 
and perplexing themes that arise particularly in chapters one and two of Sellars’ Science and Metaphysics. 
Certain features of Sellars’ interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism should be clear from what 
we have seen already, however. Whereas Graham Bird had already published his book on Kant’s Theory 
of Knowledge in 1962 (and cf. Bird 2006, Ch. 23), arguing that Kant’s first Critique was not in fact 
committed to the real existence of ‘things in themselves’ (though we are of course, for Kant, 
committed to the indispensable but problematic idea or empty thought of such a grounding); and 
Henry Allison would later develop his highly influential ‘two standpoint’ interpretation of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, which would similarly render problematic any straightforward ontological 
interpretations of the real significance for Kant of our admittedly indispensable idea of ‘things in 
themselves’; both Strawson and Sellars, by contrast, interpreted Kant’s non-spatiotemporal things in 
themselves in a straightforwardly ontological manner, as Kant’s view on what really exists. Strawson 
 
4 In O’Shea 2016, Ch. 7, ‘What to Take Away from Sellars’s Kantian Naturalism’, I have indicated how I would reject 
certain aspects of the picture above, retaining both Sellars’ outlook on Kant’s theory of experience and central 
components of his scientific naturalism/scientific realism, but rejecting his contention that problems pertaining to 
sensible qualities and the nature of scientific progress must entail the falsity ‘strictly speaking’ of our common sense 
ontology of colored, persisting substantial kinds. The latter contention I regard in fallibilist terms as a hypothesis that, 
in light of debates both in the philosophy of perception  and concerning the status of the ‘special sciences’ over the 
last four decades, is neither inconceivable nor mandatory, but unlikely to provide the best explanation of how all things 
‘hang together’ (PSIM I, §1). See Landy 2011, including his concluding ‘Postscript to Transcendental Idealism’, for 
a recent fruitful investigation of many of the same issues in Kant and Sellars that I am exploring in this chapter. I will 
not attempt to sort out the similarities and differences between our two accounts on this occasion, but I am happy to 
note that there are substantial aspects of similarity. 
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reached the more usual conclusion at the time of finding Kant’s transcendental idealism, so 
interpreted, to be hopelessly problematic. On his reading, furthermore, Kant’s own conception of the 
‘appearances’ was infected as a result with the sort of implausibly subjectivist phenomenalism (unlike 
the better ‘face’ or analysis of objectivity and the unity of experience that Strawson also found in Kant) 
that Bird had already diagnosed as the typical absurd consequence of traditional strongly ontological 
conceptions of Kant’s idea of ‘things in themselves’. Sellars’ interpretation was unusual among 
English-language interpreters of Kant at the time in defending a more plausible non-phenomenalist, 
intentionalist interpretation of Kant’s own empirical realism (that is, in contrast to the more usual 
senses of ‘phenomenalism’ typified in some respects by Bennett (1966) and revitalized in more recent 
times by Van Cleve, 1999), 5  but nonetheless conjoined (pace Bird and Allison) with a strongly 
ontological reading of Kant’s own things in themselves.6 An important example of Sellars’ attempt to 
merge something like both of these ‘faces’ of Kant together is provided by the topic of the next section, 
which focuses on chapter one of Science and Metaphysics, ‘Sensibility and Understanding’.7 
 
 
2. Nonconceptual Sensibility, Conceptual Understanding, and Singular Intuitions 
 
 
 For Sellars, it was a crucial insight of Kant’s to recognize ‘the need for a sharp distinction 
between sensibility and understanding’ (SM I, §3), and thus to break the classical empiricist and 
rationalist sensory-cognitive continuum that Kant had correctly diagnosed as characterizing both 
Locke’s sensualizing of the understanding and Leibniz’s intellectualizing of the appearances (cf. 
A271/B327). Central to Sellars’ own philosophy, correspondingly, was a complex but firm distinction 
between the (intensional, but not intentional) nonconceptual sensory representation ‘of’ objects and the 
(intentional, and so intensional) conceptual representation ‘of’ objects, with both dimensions of 
‘aboutness’ being integrated in adult human sense perceptual knowledge (cf. SM I, §§56–9; EPM V, 
§§24–5). On Sellars’ view, which he finds ‘implicit in’ and regards as philosophically required by Kant’s 
account, the two different sorts of states, conceptual and nonconceptual, possess different types of 
object-representational content, both of which are integrated in human perception. The first chapter of 
Science and Metaphysics partly defends and partly criticizes Kant’s version of this distinction by seeking 
to expose and clarify its ambiguities when presented in terms of Sellars’ own distinctions. The result 
presents challenges for the reader along multiple dimensions that I hope to clarify. I will begin first 
 
5 In O’Shea 2015 I support the claim that Kant and Sellars both defended non-phenomenalist conceptions of empirical 
realism, causal lawfulness, and objectivity, despite the perennial temptation to read Kant in such phenomenalist terms. 
When Sellars writes of ‘Kant’s phenomenalism’ he is not interpreting Kant’s ‘phenomena’ or appearances in a way 
that is inconsistent with Sellars’ own well-known critiques of phenomenalism, which he regarded as based on an 
incorrect, non-Kantian analysis of the conceptual structure of the (Kantian) manifest image.  The issue is a delicate 
one, since Sellars’ characterizations of Kant’s appearances ‘as the contents of actual and obtainable conceptual 
representings’ (SM VI, §61, quoted earlier) obviously bear a surface resemblance to typical phenomenalist ‘if...then’ 
analyses of our experience. In the article cited I clarify the distinction between Kant’s view and the ‘phenomenalist 
temptation’ with reference to Kant, Strawson, C. I. Lewis, Sellars, and Brandom. 
 
6  The last two decades have witnessed a resurgence of strongly ontological interpretations of Kant’s things in 
themselves (including non-phenomenalist readings), particularly viewed as developing out of, but preserving in key 
metaphysical respects, Kant’s pre-critical Leibnizian heritage. Rae Langton (1998) was a particularly influential book 
along those lines. 
 
7 For a probing discussion of Sellars’ SM chapter one, see McDowell 2009, chapters 1 and 2. I have examined 
McDowell’s conceptualist outlook in that book in detail elsewhere. 
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with the topic of nonconceptual sensory representations, which picks up on a central theme from 
section §1 above. 
 
 Having a sense impression or nonconceptual representation of a red rectangle is to sense in 
the manner normally and reliably caused by red rectangles (for example, by facing sides of bricks), which 
explains the logical non-extensionality that is involved in our (and other animals’) being able to have 
such an impression ‘of’ or sensorily represent a red rectangle when there is in fact no red rectangular 
physical object in the environment (SM I, §§56–9). For Sellars, here knowingly going well beyond 
anything in Kant, it was important that such ‘mediating’ nonconceptual sensory states of the perceiver 
are not merely characterized in topic-neutral functional terms (‘a state of the kind normally caused by...’ etc., 
as for example in J. J. C. Smart’s physicalism). Rather, the theorist must introduce ‘new predicates’ 
that provide positive intrinsic characterizations of such conscious, qualitative sensory states (cf. SM I, 
§55; EPM IV and XVI; PSIM VI). Such contents are conceived by analogy with the colors, shapes, and 
other attributes and relations of their (normally) corresponding physical causes, which such sense 
impressions thereby nonconceptually track and represent (or ‘picture’: cf. SM V). Sellars also defends 
the further controversial thesis, which I will not explore here, that such qualitative sensings, though 
they are indeed broadly ‘physical’ in the sense of being fully located and causally operative within the 
natural world (partly constituting central nervous systems), they cannot according to Sellars be 
‘physical’ as that term has most often been (he thinks, over-restrictively) understood by physicalists.8  
 
 In key respects outlined above I believe that Sellars ought to be classified in contemporary 
philosophy of perception and in relation to the recent Kant literature (cf. Schulting, ed., 2016) as a 
defender of nonconceptual (object-representational) content, though one who sought, perhaps in some ways 
similar to Gareth Evans (1982) subsequently, to embed such nonconceptual sensory-informational 
‘tracking’ content within, and as having ‘a strong voice in’ (SM I, §39) the integrated outcome of an 
otherwise strongly conceptualist understanding of adult human perceptual knowledge. For 
understandable reasons, however, Sellars has to the contrary almost universally been classified in these 
debates through the lens of John McDowell’s subsequent conceptualism: the position, crudely put, that 
the representational content of adult human perception is exhaustively conceptual content. Robert 
Hanna, for example, writes of Sellars’ (alleged) ‘rejection of non-conceptual content’ due to his (and 
later, McDowell’s) rejection of the Myth of the Given. Hanna thus takes it as obvious that ‘Davidson 
and Sellars are both clearly thoroughgoing conceptualists avant la lettre’ (Hanna 2006, 82, 89). While we 
cannot enter here into the complex details of the contemporary debates about nonconceptual content, 
both in general and in Kant (Schulting, ed., 2016 is a good place to start),9 Brady Bowman in the 
following passage provides a useful snapshot of the typical roles of some of the main players in the 
current debates concerning Kant and nonconceptualism (my interpolations added): 
 
8 Sellars notoriously held the view that such qualitatively contentful sensings or sense impressions (of a red cube, for 
example), while they are ‘physical’ in the all-inclusive sense of being natural spatio-temporal-causal items (Sellars’ 
‘physical1’), they must in another, narrower sense (‘physical2’) be non-physical2 states of consciousness, in that the 
physical2 primitives defined as those adequate to explain inorganic, insensate life, are in principle (Sellars contended) 
inadequate to explain the intrinsic contents of qualitative sensory consciousness. Sellars’ philosophical hypothesis is 
thus that a future physics of neurophysiological processes will need to introduce new (non-physical2) primitives in 
order to explain sensory consciousness. This further analogical hypothesis is operative in SM I, but Sellars is well 
aware that it goes beyond anything explicitly in Kant. 
 
9  I am not convinced, for instance,  that the recently much discussed distinction between ‘state’ vs. ‘content’ 
nonconceptualism makes it more plausible to deny that Sellars is a nonconceptualist in any interesting sense (I take it 
that Hanna holds this with regard to Sellars), but I cannot engage that particular issue here. 
 
 8 
 
Like the more recent figurehead Gareth Evans [1982], Kant figures ambiguously in the debate 
between conceptualists and non-conceptualists, being claimed as an illustrious predecessor by 
both sides. For example, some of McDowell’s more recent [2009] discussions of the content 
of sense experience are framed as interpretations of Kant that elicit from him a more 
consistent and nuanced conceptualism even than that propounded by Sellars, thus vindicating 
[Kant] against Sellars’s criticisms [in SM I]. Apparently with equal plausibility, Hanna [e.g., 
2006] interprets Kant as a powerful theoretician of non-conceptual content, drawing on Kant’s 
doctrine of the specific difference between intuitions and concepts. While Hanna 
acknowledges the famous passages that seem to place Kant unambiguously in the 
conceptualist camp [e.g., ‘intuitions without concepts are blind’ (A51/B75)], he also draws 
attention to remarks in the Critique of Pure Reason that seem equally unambiguously to state that 
objects can appear to us without having any relation to the functions of the understanding, i.e. 
to concepts [e.g., ‘appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by 
no means requires the functions of thinking’ (A89–90/B122–3)]. (Bowman 2011, 419) 
 
Let us examine the aspects of Sellars’ view as expressed in SM chapter one that make it plausible to 
classify him as a conceptualist, which I contend he sought to integrate with his substantive conception 
of nonconceptual, distinctively sensory-representational content. Sellars’ view was that Kant nearly 
succeeded in expressing a view having this shape (i.e., the shape of Sellars’ own position), but that he 
crucially failed to clarify the relevant distinctions required. 
 
 Sellars throughout his works stresses Kant’s view that, for beings like us, the possibility of our 
representing any empirically mind-independent object of experience at all – that is, in such a way that 
we are capable of representing the object as located and persisting independently of our representing 
it – requires the sorts of conceptual syntheses in judgment that Kant articulates throughout the 
transcendental analytic. In particular, both Sellars and subsequently McDowell interpret Kant’s claim 
in such a way that it extends the requirement of conceptualization to Kant’s account of the singular 
and immediate sensible intuition of any objects that may appear to us. Sellars focuses, for instance, on 
this well-known passage from Kant’s ‘metaphysical deduction’ or ‘clue’ to the transcendental 
deduction (cf. Sellars SM I, §10, and McDowell 2009, Ch. 14: ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’):    
 
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives 
unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which expressed 
generally, is called the pure concept of understanding. (A79/B104–5) 
 
Sellars explains (in particular in KTI) that it is the ‘same function’ of conceptual synthesis that governs 
what Kant later in the transcendental deduction calls the ‘productive imagination’, which is involved 
constitutively in all our perceptual cognitions. Hence our ‘immediate’ sensible intuitions of objects in 
perception are, in this primary sense of ‘intuition’ on Sellars’ reading of Kant, a distinctive kind of 
singular, indexical (this-here-now), conceptualized thought of the given empirical object that directly evokes 
this non-inferential response in the perceiver (e.g., this red cube). Such a singular intuitive perceptual 
‘taking-to-be’ involves the productive imagination’s ‘intimate blend of sensing and imaging and 
conceptualization’ (IKTE II, §23). This aspect of Sellars’ reading of Kant on sensible intuition is 
plausibly regarded as ‘conceptualist’ in at least the sense that it takes our most basic and immediate 
sensory awarenesses of objects (as the intuited subject-terms available for judgment) to be constituted by a 
certain kind of conceptual representational content. In this way such sensible intuitions or immediate 
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perceptual takings are thus shown already to involve the categories in our cognition of ‘whatever objects 
may come before our senses’ (B159), and this is the linchpin of Kant’s transcendental deduction. 
 
 What Sellars further argues in SM I, however (and similarly in the ‘Appendix’ to SM as far as 
the form of time rather than space is concerned), as we have already seen, is that ‘our conceptual 
representations of the spatial structure of physical states of affairs are guided by [analogous] 
“counterpart” features of our [nonconceptual] sense impressions’ (SM Appendix, §3, my 
interpolations added). And as we have seen, the same account holds for such intrinsic qualitative 
sensory contents as the perceived red and rectangular surface of a brick: our conceptualized perceptual 
responses in such cases are ‘guided by’ the counterpart quasi-red, quasi-rectangular nonconceptual 
contents of the corresponding sense impressions. That the ‘guiding’ nonconceptual sensory states that 
have a ‘strong voice in the outcome’ are genuinely intensional representational contents, for Sellars, has to 
do not only with the postulated theoretical (for Sellars’ Kant, ‘transcendental’) hypothesis that 
‘impressions have attributes and stand in relations which are counterparts of the attributes and 
relations of physical objects and events’ (SM I, §65). It also has to do with the further fact that these 
substantive sense impression/outer object isomorphisms normally ‘track’ objects and thus ‘guide us’ 
reliably in our actions and in our judgments.  
 
 On Sellars’ own wider views (cf. Sellars MEV, 1981), these animal and logical representational 
or isomorphic ‘picturing’ achievements are thanks both to our bodily nature (for Sellars, our proper 
biological functioning due ultimately to natural selection) and our conceptual capacities (reflecting a logical 
space of reasons derived from culturally inherited norms or ‘ought-to-bes’ of assertional practice). He 
sees Kant as essentially having put forward a nativist faculty version, involving Kant’s pure a priori 
forms of sensibility (‘Space and Time’) and understanding (the categories), of an outlook on cognition 
that otherwise is very close to Sellars’ own integrated conceptualist and nonconceptualist picture. 
Sellars characterizes the nonconceptual aspect of Kant’s views on sensible intuition as a ‘sheer 
receptivity’ (e.g., SM I §§9–10, 17–19, 73–8 ), in contrast to Kant’s fully developed conception of 
intuitions as singular conceptualized thought-responses to objects that are guided by and incorporate 
such nonconceptual contents. However, it is important to bear in mind that such sensible contents 
are ‘sheer’ only in the sense of ‘being in no sense conceptual’ ((SM I §16). They are not ‘sheer’ in the 
sense of lacking those reliable patterns of specific counterpart relational structures and intrinsic 
characters that make them the nonconceptual representations of objects of corresponding kinds and 
structures that they are. 
 
 The question is: how much of Sellars’ own robust conception of such nonconceptual sensory 
representations, as I have sketched it in this chapter, can one actually find in Kant? How much goes 
beyond anything in Kant?  And how much does Sellars himself recognize goes beyond Kant’s own 
views?  
 
 In relation to ‘sheer receptivity’ Sellars refers us to Kant’s characterizations (e.g., A99ff.) of 
sensory receptivity as providing us with a ‘manifold of representations, but not with a representation of a 
manifold, which latter [Kant] proceeds to equate with representation of a manifold as a manifold’ (SM I, §19), 
i.e., with intuition in the conceptualized sense. But here Sellars argues that Kant, unlike Sellars’ own 
view of the structured counterpart sensory relations that are isomorphic to the outer spatial relations 
of the physical objects they (nonconceptually) represent, was unfortunately committed to the 
following dead-end claim: 
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[Kant is committed to the claim] that what the representations of sheer receptivity are of is in 
no sense complex, and hence that the representations of outer sense as such are not 
representations of spatial complexes. If I am right, the idea that Space is the form of outer 
sense is incoherent. Space can scarcely be the form of the representings of outer sense [JOS: 
hence the need for Sellars’ own theory of analogous counterpart relations for sense-manifolds]; and 
if it is not the form of its representeds, i.e. if nothing represented by outer sense as such is a 
spatial complex, the idea that Space is the form of outer sense threatens to disappear. (SM I, 
§19) 
 
Contemporary interpreters who have defended the view that Kant is a nonconceptualist (again, cf. 
Schulting, ed. 2016) might well step in with other arguments to bolster Sellars’ contention that 
nonetheless ‘Kant “implicitly” gives some such account’ as Sellars has outlined of the nonconceptual 
intuitional representation of space (and of time, and of the sensible ‘particulars’ that occupy them), or 
that Kant ‘must have done so’ (SM I, §78). But the actual ‘cash’ that Sellars provides for finding such 
a story in Kant is minimal by his own admission, and his main conclusion is that Kant’s failure to make 
the distinction clearly (in particular by ‘overlooking the importance of analogical concepts – save in 
theological contexts’) had the unfortunate effect of sending subsequent philosophers on a nineteenth 
century reprise of the sensory-cognitive continuum of Locke and Leibniz: 
 
Kant’s failure to distinguish clearly between the ‘forms’ of receptivity proper and the ‘forms’ 
of that which is represented by the intuitive conceptual representations which are ‘guided’ by 
receptivity – a distinction which is demanded both by the thrust of his argument, and by sound 
philosophy – had as its consequence that no sooner had he left the scene than these particular 
waters were muddied by Hegel and the Mills, and philosophy had to begin the slow climb 
‘back to Kant’ which is still underway. (SM I, §75) 
 
 
§3 Conclusion: Sellars’ Variations on Kant’s Appearances and Things in Themselves 
  
 
 Sellars’ strongly ontological reading of Kant’s things in themselves has stressed Kant’s use of 
analogical thinking ‘in theological contexts’, no doubt thinking of Kant’s various ways of spelling out 
reason’s experience-transcending ideas of the ‘unconditioned’ (God, freedom, a community of souls) 
as ‘ground of the appearances’ in nature, in both morally-practical and regulative-theoretical terms. 
Occasionally Sellars, as we have seen, and his student Jay Rosenberg after him, suggest that Kant also 
held something like Sellars’ own view of the analogical structure of ‘things in themselves’ and possibly 
even its Sellarsian reflection in the theoretically postulated analogical structure of our sensings ‘in 
themselves’ (i.e., Sellars’ analogically spatial and analogically temporal sensory s-manifolds and t-
manifolds: e.g., SM Appendix §§17–23). Thus both of them refer to Kant’s reference to a ‘duration’ 
that is ‘not a time’ (B149, Sellars SM II.17, Rosenberg 2005, 78–9; Sellars there also cites Kant’s 
reference at B798 to the concept of ‘a presence that is not spatial’ as at least ‘non-contradictory’). 
Sellars, however, is very cautious in this regard, since he also holds that ‘Kant’s treatment of sensation 
is notoriously inadequate and inept’ (KTE I, §3n; cf. SM II, §39n). And in fact, in his own lectures on 
Kant at Pittsburgh (reproduced in Sellars 2002b KPT 131), Sellars in fact makes clear that “Kant 
himself never says” that the manifold of sense is “quasi-spatial, somehow spatial,” that is, analogously 
spatial in Sellars’ postulated sense, in contrast to (but on Sellars’ view undergirding) the form of space 
that we conceptually represent via the transcendental imagination. 
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 Or again, at SM II, §72 Sellars remarks that:  
 
it would still have been open to Kant to say that things-in-themselves, in so far as they affect 
our sensibility, have, like sense impressions, attributes and relations which are in their own way 
analogous to those of perceptible things, and by virtue of which they elicit sense impressions 
which are in their different way endowed with Space-like characteristics (confused by Kant with 
the form of outer intuition), and perform the guiding role described above. That Kant 
implicitly accepted some such view of things-in-themselves is, I think, clear. Yet if the fact had 
been brought to his attention he would most certainly have claimed that this transcendental 
use of analogy is empty. The abstract concept of such Space-like characteristics could have ‘cash 
value’ only for God. (SM II, §72) 
 
I think, pace Sellars, that it was not ‘clear’ that Kant ‘implicitly accepted some such view of things-in-
themselves’, indeed partly for the reason of emptiness that Sellars here cites. Or again, Sellars remarks 
that Kant ‘nowhere denies, and is not committed to denying, that the manifold of external sense as 
such is a relational structure. Indeed, the more general point can be made that Kant nowhere denies 
or need deny that the in-itself has a relational structure’ (SM I, §76). In these passages and elsewhere 
I find the cited evidence to be extremely thin that Kant actually held or implicitly believed anything 
like the (non-theologically) analogical conception of either things in themselves or of our sense 
impressions that Sellars and Rosenberg suggest Kant either held, or implicitly held, or at least did not 
deny and had it ‘open’ to him to hold. Sellars himself clearly wants to find this more committal 
‘analogical’ view to be ‘implicit’ in Kant’s views on sensibility, but it is in fact, I conclude, nowhere to 
be found in Kant. Rosenberg, who along with Sellars has taught me more truths worth preserving 
from Kant’s theory of experience than any other Kant commentator, asserts these doubtful claims 
concerning Kant’s things in themselves more strongly than Sellars did, asserting straightforwardly that 
‘Kant’s story of spatial experience’ (2005, 80) in effect includes all of the analogical elements 
conjectured by Sellars to have implicitly informed Kant’s views on sensibility and things in themselves. 
 
 Sellars concludes his remark above that Kant ‘nowhere denies’ that things in themselves or 
our sense impressions have structures analogous to those we perceive in physical objects, by stating 
that what Kant ‘does deny, whether for good reasons or for bad, a topic for subsequent discussion, is 
that the relations we conceptually represent are the relations which the in-itself exemplifies’ (SM I, 
§76). Sellars in fact goes on to argue in SM Chapter II, ‘Appearances and Things in Themselves: 1. 
Material Things’, that Kant’s own reasons for denying that ‘the relations we conceptually represent are 
the relations which the in-itself exemplifies’ were indeed unsound arguments.  However, Sellars also 
indicates that there exists a sound argument ‘for the transcendental ideality of the [MI] perceptual 
world’, one which ‘lies in the distinction between perceptible physical objects and the objects of 
theoretical science, a distinction which was blurred by Kant’ (SM II, §71n; cf. Landy 2011, ‘Postscript’; 
O’Shea 2016, Ch. 7). The subsequent discussion (SM II, §§72–4) shows that Sellars here has in mind, 
of course, his own arguments pertaining to the ontological relocation and theoretical reconception of 
color-expanses that we rehearsed briefly in section §1 above. This, Sellars concludes, is an ‘argument 
for the transcendental ideality of perceptible things which really works, and is the one I shall espouse’ 
(SM II, §69).  
 
 My own view is that Sellars’ general suggestion in Science and Metaphysics that Kant may have 
sought, as did Sellars himself, to integrate the conception of a certain kind of nonconceptual sensory 
representation of objects within an otherwise strongly conceptualist outlook on our perceptual 
cognition, represented an important anticipation of later ‘nonconceptualist’ views both in general and 
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in the interpretation of Kant. Furthermore, I have argued elsewhere that one can retain Sellars’ 
‘Kantian naturalist’ hypothesis of a middle way on that and other topics without accepting Sellars’ 
(which is not Kant’s) radical ‘transcendental idealist’ thesis that the manifest image or common sense 
world of colored objects ‘is radically false, i.e., there really are no such things as the physical objects 
and processes of the common sense framework’ (though of course Sellars emphasizes that there are 
scientifically reconceived counterparts to those objects) (SRII V, §23). Sellars’ arguments specifically 
based on color and other sensible qualities rest on premises and qualia intuitions that have increasingly 
been shown to be highly contentious.  
 
 Furthermore, while I am also sympathetic to Sellars’ outlook on conceptual change in science 
and to his anti-instrumentalist scientific realism in general, the idea that the paradigms of scientific 
progress provided by the revolutionary shifts from Newton to Einstein, or from the Charles-Boyle 
phenomenal gas law to the kinetic theory of gases, should lead us to conclude that all scientific progress 
(including in all the ‘special sciences’) will or must be characterized by this ontological replacement 
model, strikes me as just the sort of matter that Sellars’ Peircean fallibilism ought to have left open. 
So with respect to both the problem of color and the fact of scientific revolutions, I resist Sellars’ 
philosophical contention that either of them entails the ‘strictly speaking’ falsity of higher-level 
ontologies, including our common sense conception of persisting colored objects.  
 
 I conclude that Sellars’ and Rosenberg’s attempts to preserve the core truths in Kant’s theory 
of experience, and to integrate them with an overall scientific naturalist outlook on the nature of things 
– including the nonconceptual representational dimension of perceptual experience examined in this 
chapter – can and should survive the rejection of some of their more doubtful interpretations and 
adaptations of Kant’s ‘transcendental idealism’ in particular. Perhaps the perplexities arising from 
Sellars’ interpretive replacement of Kant’s transcendental idealism by his own manifest 
image/scientific image distinction should also lead us to reassess wholesale, once again, the strongly 
ontological reading of Kant’s own views on our largely empty thought of ‘things in themselves’ as the 
‘ground of appearances’. It may well be that Kant’s own ‘empirical realism’, which included within it, 
for Kant, whatever lawfully successful scientific postulations might happen to fall outside the particular 
limits or thresholds of our sense organs (A225–6/B272–3),10 is realism enough for any plausible 
scientific realism.  It is certainly realism enough, I believe, to support the sort of Kantian naturalist 
outlook on human beings and the world that Sellars sought to envision.11 
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